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The Iowans at Fort Donelson
General C. F. Smith's Attack on the Confederate Right
February 12-16, 1862
by EDWIN C. BEABSS
(To be continued in the next issue)
"No terms except unconditional and immediate surrender can
be accepted."—U. S. Grant
It was obvious to the Tennessee authorities that the Cumber-
land and Tennessee Rivers provided an ideal invasion route
into the heart of their state. A Union amphibious force using
these rivers as the axis of its advance, if unopposed, would
be able to drive deeply into Middle Tennessee, cut the vital
Memphis and Charleston, and the Memphis, Glarksville and
Louisville Railroads and capture Nashville. To shield the
state from such an attack, the Tennesseans surveyed and began
the consti-uctíon of defenses to guard these two rivers. Since
Kentucky seemed determined to remain neutral in the im-
pending conflict. Governor Isham G. Harris of Tennessee or-
dered the fortifications constructed near the border. Fort
Henry was located on the east bank of the Tennessee River
and Fort Donelson on the west bank of the Cumberland, 12
mues apart. After Tennessee adhered to the Confederacy, the
Confederate authorities assumed responsibility for the com-
pletion and defense of the forts.
In September 1861, the Southerners violated Kentucky neu-
trality and seized and fortified Columbus on tlie Mississippi
River. In reprisal, the Federals occupied Paducah at the
mouth of the Tennessee River. Shortly thereafter, Kentucky
declared for the Union. The security' of West Tennessee, Nash-
ville, and the vital railroads now depended on tiie Confeder-
ates' ability to hold Forts Heniy and Donelson.
Examining their maps, the Federal leaders could see the tre-
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FORT DONELSON
Point where the Second Iowa charged the Rebel works and
placed their flag. Reprint: Iowa in Wartimes, Byers, 1888
IOWANS AT FORT DONELSON 243
mendous advantages to the Union if they could capture the
forts. Besides opening Middle Tennessee to invasion, the fall
of the forts would compel tlie strong Confederate forces at
Columbus and Bowling Green, Kentucky, to fall back to avoid
being encircled. With the loss of these key posts, the Confed-
erate defense line in the West would be hopelessly shattered.
The Southerners would have to withdraw into north Alabama
and Mississippi.
At the beginning of February, 1862, a Union amphibious
force started up the Tennessee River en route to Fort Henry.
The 15,000 bluecoated soldiers were led by Brigadier Cen-
eral Ulysses S. Grant; the four ironclad and three timber-clad
gunboats were commanded by Flag Officer Andrew H. Foote.
Several miles below Fort Henry, the transports stopped and
the troops disembarked. Brigadier General John A. McClem-
and's division was landed on the east side of the river, and
Brigadier General Gharles F. Smith's on the west bank. Grant
scheduled the attack for the 6th.
According to Grant and Foote's plan of operations, the four
ironclads, supported by the three timber-clads, were to attack
Fort Henry, while McCIemand's infantry moved against the
land approaches to the fort. C. F. Smith's column was to oc-
cupy Fort Heiman on the opposite side of the river.
When the Federals advanced against Fort Heniy, it was
garrisoned by about 3,000 Confederates commanded by
Colonel Adolphus Heiman, but the fort had not been properly
located. The Tennessee River was flooding and Fort Henry
was threatened with inundation. When Brigadier General
Lloyd Tilghman visited the fort, he decided it would be im-
possible to defend and ordered it evacuated. To cover the
retreat of the garrison to Fort Donelson, Tilghman decided to
fight a holding action. Accompanied by the cannoneers of
Taylor's Tennessee Battery, Tilghman took up his battle station
in Fort Henry.
About noon, the Union gunboats started bombarding the
fort. The Confederate artillerists retumed the bluejackets'
fire. Within 75 minutes, the Union warships were able to dis-
mount most of the Southerners' guns. In return, the Confed-
erates disabled one of the ironclads, the Essex, and heavily
damaged another, the Cincinnati. Having accöniplished his
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mission of delaying the Federals long enough to allow Hei-
man's command to make its escape, Tilghman ordered the fort
smTendered. Several hours after the Confederates had lowered
the flag, the Union infantry reached the fort.
With Fort Henry in his possession. Grant prepared to "take
and destroy Fort Donelson on the 8th." If the general were
to have adequate naval support in this operation, several of
the damaged ironclads would have to be replaced. Grant had
to postpone his attack, while Flag Officer Foote returned to
Gairo, Illinois, to obtain additional vessels. Gonsequently, it
was the afternoon of the 11th before preparations were com-
pleted. McGlemaiid's division started for Fort Donelson im-
mediately; G. F. Smith's command marched on tlie following
morning.
In the meantime. General Albert S. Johnston, the Gonfed-
erate commander in the West, had thi-own thousands of re-
inforcements into the Fort Donelson perimeter. By the mom-
ing of the 13th, there were over 18,000 Southern soldiers in
the area. Brigadier General John B. Floyd assumed command
of the Fort Donelson Gonfederates at that time.
On the previous day. Grant's army, 17,000 strong, had ar-
rived in front of the Gonfederate perimeter. Except for the
slashing attacks on McGlernand's vanguard by Lieutenant
Golonel Nathan B. Forrest's cavalry, the bluecoats encountered
no opposition as they took position in front of the Gonfed-
erate works. During the day, one of Foote's ironclads, the
Carondelet, reached Fort Donelson. To signal her arrival, tlie
Carondelet fired a few rounds into tlie Water Batteries. The
Gonfederate gunners did not reply.
Grant's army sought to complete its investment of the
Fort Donelson perimeter on the 13th. Troops from McGlern-
and's and Smith's commands launched limited attacks on dif-
ferent sectors of the Gonfederate lines. On the Union left, the
2d Kentucky easily turned back Smith's thrust. McGlernand's
assault on the Gonfederate center was repulsed by Golonel
Heiman's brigade. These setbacks, in conjunction with reports
indicating that the Southerners had at least as many troops
as he had, caused Grant to hesitate. He would await the arrival
of reinforcements and the rest of Foote's ironclads before
completing the investment of the Gonfederate stronghold.
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The Carondelet attacked the Water Batteries a second time
on the 13th. This time, the Confederate cannoneers returned
the gunboat's fire. Before the ironclad broke off the engage-
ment and dropped down river, both sides had suffered cas-
ualties and damage.
Late in the afternoon, the vnnd changed and it began to
rain and turn cold. For several days it had been unseasonably
wai-m. Many of the soldiers had discarded their overcoats and
warm clothing. As the temperature continued to drop, the
precipitation changed to sleet, then to snow. This rapid shift
in the weather caused great suffering.
During the night. Flag Officer Foote reached the Fort Don-
elson area with three ironclads and two timber-clads. The
warships had escorted a large convoy with thousands of rein-
forcements for Grant's army up the Cumberland River.
On the afternoon of the 14th, after the troops had disem-
barked, the gunboats prepared to attack the Water Batteries.
Abreast, the four ironclads chugged slowly up the river. The
two timber-clads followed tlie ironclads. Within a few min-
utes, the Union sailors and Confederate heavy artillerists were
hlazing away at each other. Foote's ironclads were able to
close to within one-fourth mile of the death-dealing Water
Batteries before theii- advance was checked. Registering re-
peated hits on the gunboats, which disabled three of the
ironclads, the Confederates repulsed the naval attack.
Pending tlie repair of the gunboats and the arrival of addi-
tional troops, Crant determined to lay siege to Fort Donelson.
General Floyd knew that if the ganison allowed Grant to
carry out his plans, the Gonfederates would be compelled to
surrender. He decided to have his army cut its way through
the investing lines. At daybreak on the 15th, Brigadier Gen-
eral Gideon J. Pillow's Gonfederate command launched a
slashing attack on the Union right flank division led by General
McGlemand.
* * *
At daybreak on February 15, when the Confederates launch-
ed their powerful onslaught on the Union right, five of the
eight brigades constituting Ceneral Crant's investing army
were operating west of Indian Creek. Detachments from four
of these brigades occupied the line of outposts which the
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Federal oflBcers had established on the ridges paralleling the
commanding ground occupied by the Rebels' rifie pits. The
other brigade. Colonel Morgan L. Smith's, was held in re-
serve.
Until the early hours of the 15th, this sector of the Fort
Donelson perimeter had been held by Brigadier General Simon
B. Buckner's division. In accordance with the plan of opera-
tions adopted by the council of war, convened by General
Floyd on the night of the 14th, it had been determined to use
Buckner's troops to bolster General Pillow's attack on the
Yankees' right. Before Buckner's men could leave the rifle
pits which they had held for the past three days, it would be
necessary to have troops from another unit relieve them.
Colonel John W. Head's 30th Tennessee, which had been hold-
ing the Erin Hollow sector, would take the place of Buckner's
command. Following the departure of Buckner's ü'oops, the
three-quarters of a mile of rifie pits west of Indian Creek,
formerly held by 3,600 soldiers, would be occupied by approxi-
mately 450 ofiBcers and men. The Rebel brass felt justified in
taking this calculated risk. It was the Rebel generals' consid-
ered opinion that the Yankees would be so hard-pressed de-
vising measures to cope with Pillow's assault, they would be
luiable to capitalize on this situation.^
When the orders to report to General Biickner reached the
command post of the 30th Tennessee about 2 a.m., both
Colonel Head and Lieutenant Golonel R. H. Murphy were
absent. The two colonels, quite ill, were spending the night
at the fort. On perusing the dispatch, the ranking ofiicer pres-
ent. Major James J. Turner, sent a runner to the fort to ac-
quaint Colonel Head with the situation. Pending Head's ap-
pearance, the major directed his subordinates to rouse tlieir
commands. This proved to be difficult, the major recalled, "as
many men had scarcely slept for thi-ee days and nights, and
had lain in the trenches for two days and nights in the mud,
rain, sleet, and snow, wdthout fire or adequate clotliing to
protect them from such exposure." Considerable time was lost
in forming and mustering the troops. Once the men had fallen
in, the regiment moved out. As a result of the icy condition of
1 The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of
the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Vol. VII, 331. (Cited here-
after as O. R.)
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the road, the march was greatly retarded. Dawn was approach-
ing before the men of the 30th Tennessee filed into the
trenches. Immediately following the Tennesseeaiis' appear-
ance, Buckner's troops, who had been standing by for a con-
siderable time anxiously awaiting their arrival, hit the road.^
Before departing for the Confederate left, Buckner called
for Colonel Head. ( The colonel, upon receiving Turner's mes-
sage, had rejoined his command.) Buckner informed Head
that his regiment was to occupy the rifle pits formerly held
by his division, and, "if attacked and overpowered, to fall
back into the fort."
In an effort to accomplish this difficult assignment. Head
divided his command. Major Turner, accompanied by Cap-
tains J. L. Carson's, T. C. Martin's, and W. T. Sample's com-
panies, was charged with the defense of the detached rifle
pits covering the Eddyville road formerly held by Colonel
Roger W. Hanson's crack 2d Kentucky. The six other com-
panies belonging to the regiment would hold the tienches
previously occupied by the six regiments constituting Colonel
John C. BrowTi's brigade. In deploying his detachment. Major
Turner placed Carson's and Sample's units in the rifle pits;
Martin's was held in reserve. To make matters worse, tlie
three batteries (Jacksons', Graves', and Porter's) which had
employed their 16 guns to assist Buckner's division in holding
this sector of the Fort Donelson perimeter, had been with-
drawn to support Pillow's attack on the Union right.^
At daybreak the Union sharpshooters, with their long-
ranged rifle-muskets, opened fire on Colonel Head's greyclads.
Being equipped with "short-range guns," the Tennesseeans
found it unhealthy to e.xpose themselves. They were forced to
"keep well under cover or be picked off." Major Turner re-
called, "A more cheerless day we never spent. It was cloudy
and cold. For five hours we could hear the clash of arms on the
east, and we expected the army to go out, leaving us to hold
the fort and sun-ender."*
o « 0
The Union divisions commanded by Brigadier Cenerals
^Ibid., 377; Fort Henry and Fort Donehon Campaigns-February,
1862 (Fort Leavenwortli, 1923), 673-674. (Cited hereafter as Source
Book.)
3 O. R., Series I, Vol. VU. 377; Source Book. 674.
4 Ibid.
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Charles F. Smith and Lewis Wallace spent the night of the
14th on the ridges and in the hollows west of Indian Creek.
Wallace's division, which had been organized dvuing the day,
was posted on the right, Smitli's on the left. Wallace's main
line of resistance rested on the crest of a ridge overlooking
the hollow which debouches into Indian Creek, about 250
yards southwest of the Poor house. It was on this ridge that
a portion of General McCIemand's division had camped on
the night of the 12th. In Wallace's sector the higher ground
was covered with scattered timber, while the slopes of the
ridge were heavily wooded. Immediately to the rear of Wal-
lace's position lay the road which served as the line of com-
munication linking tlie wings of Grant's investing ai-my. The
valley of Indian Creek separated Wallace's right flank imit.
Colonel Charles Cruft's brigade, from McCIemand's left-
which was held by Colonel William H. L. Wallace's ti'oops.
Besides being "within good supporting distance" of W. H. L.
Wallace's troops, Cruft's outposts occupied positions "not
more than 500 yards from" the Rebels' rifle pits. Wallace's
other brigade led by Colonel John M. Thayer was posted
on Cruft's left. Patrols from Thayer's unit were in contact on
the left with pickets from General G. F. Smitli's division. In
fact Wallace, when he made a tour of inspection, discovered
that his entire line was "witliin easy cannon-shot" of the Con-
federate works. As soon as he had deployed his division, Wal-
lace received his instnictions from Ceneral Grant. His orders
were to hold his giound and prevent the Rebels from breaking
through the investment hne in the Indian Creek sector.^
Upon the advent of darkness on the 14th, Wallace had his
subordinates estabhsh and man a strong line of outposts. The
remainder of the ti'oops were permitted to retire from the crest
of the ridge. When they reached the hollows behind the ridge,
5 O. R., Series I, Vol. VII, 236-237. The following luiits comprised
Cruft's brigade: the 31st and 44th Indiana, the 17th and 24th Ken-
tucky. Thayer's brigade was composed of: the 1st Nebraska, the 58th,
68th and 76tli Ohio. Thayer's and Cruft's brigades had reached the
Fort Donelson area, by boat, on the night of February 13. The troops
were disembarked the next morning at the landing, four miles below
Fort Donelson. After a hard, circuitious march the bluecoats gained
the upper reaches of Hicktnan Creek. Before moving into position at the
front, Cruft's and Thayer's brigades were organized into a division com-
manded by General Wallace.
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the soldiers were allowed to build camp fires. After eating
their evening meal, Wallace reported, his men 'laid down as
best they could on beds of ice and snow, a strong, cold wind
making conditions still more disagreeable."
During the night, the quiet was shattered on several occa-
sions when the Gonfederate cannoneers dropped shells into
Wallace's sector. Tliis harassing fire proved to be very discon-
certing to Thayer's troops, a large portion of whom were get-
ting their first taste of combat."
On Wallace's left. General Smith's division continued to
occupy the ridge parallel to the one held by the Gonfed-
erates. The Ridge road served as the boundary between
Smith's right and Wallace's left. With the approach of dark-
ness. General Smith directed Golonels John Gook and Jacob
G. Lauman, the officers in charge of his two advance brigades,
to detail strong detachments to hold their main line of re-
sistance. (Lauman hailed from Burlington, Iowa.) The re-
mainder of the tioops could be recalled in case of an emer-
gency. Except for the soldiers assigned to outpost duty, Gook's
and Lauman's men were to be permitted to obtain rest and
refreshments as circumstances allowed.''
Golonel Gook's picket Une on Smith's right was held by
picked companies from the 50th Illinois, the 52d Indiana, and
the 12th Iowa, supported by the 13th Missouri.^ These troops,
being in proximity to the f'oe were denied the use of camp
fires. It snowed again on the night of the 14th and the troops,
especially those on outpost duty, spent anotlier terrible night
exposed to the hostile elements. Golonel Grafts J. Wright, the
commander of the 13th Missouri reported:
We remained in this position [on the ridge opposite the
Confederate rifle pits] without fires during the storm of rain
6 Ibid., 237.
•? Ibid., 221; O. H., Series I, Vol. LÎI, pt. I, 8, 10.
* The ten companies which were destined to constitute the 12th Iowa
Infantry were ordered to report to Camp Union by Governor Samuel
Kirkwood in the period from September 14 to October 10, 1861. By
November 25, the last of tlie companies had been mustered into Federal
service at Dubuque by Captain Edward C. Wasliington.
On November 28, Thanksgiving Day. the regiment, having leti Camp
Union two days before, was ferried across the Mississippi River and
boarded the waiting cars of the Ilhnois Central at Dunlieth, Illinois.
Detraining at East St. Louis on the 30tli, the Iowans recrossed the
Mississippi and marched to Benton Barracks. The 12th Iowa remained
at Benton Barracks until January 27, 1862. While at the huge camp of
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. . . [sleet], and snow. The clothes of the men were drench-
ed and frozen upon them. I sat upon a log wrapped in
my blanket until 3 o'clock, when permission was given
to go back half a mile and build fires to dry the men.
It appears that Colonel Wright was mistaken, because
Colonel Cook hadn't sanctioned the 13th Missoiiri's retirement.
When advised of Colonel Wright's move. Cook was shocked
by the regimental commander's flagrant violation of orders.
Without bothering to procure his horse. Cook proceeded on
foot to where Wright's Missourians were huddled around the
newly kindled fires. Hailing the unfortunate Wright, Cook or-
dered the Missourian to get his troops back to their original
position. By the time the regiment returned to the front it was
8 a.m. Fortunately for the bluecoats, the Confederates had
been busy regrouping their forces preparatory to tlie attempt
to break out of Fort Donelson. Consequently, no attack was
made on Cook's weakened Une of outposts during the absence
of the 13th Missouri.»
Like Colonel Cook, Lauman had called upon his regimental
commanders to detail certain companies to hold his advance
position. After these units had occupied the line of outposts,
Lauman withdrew the remainder of his troops from the wind-
instructions, the soldiers were "instructed in company and battalion drill
and the other duties of the soldier, in order that they might be prepared
to take the field against the enemy at the earliest possible date,"
After being ferried across the Missis.sippi to East St, Louis, the regi-
ment again clambered aboard railroad cars. By the next afternoon the
troops were on the Cairo wharf. Here, orders were handed to Colonel
Joseph J. Woods to take his regiment to Smithfield, Kentucky. The
Iowans were transported to Smithfield on the steamer City of Memphis.
Landing at Smithfleld on the 30th, the regiment remained encamped
there until February 5, At an early hour on the 5th, the Iowans struck
tents and boarded a steamboat. ^\rrivÍDg oíf Paducah, the boat with the
12th Iowa aboard, rendezvoused with a large convoy. Here, the regiment
was assigned to the brigade commanded by Colonel Cook, Before the
Iowans had an opportunity to get acquainted with their new command,
the convoy cast off and started up the Tennessee River. It was after
daybreak on the 6th, when the transports pulled into the east bank of
the river at Bailey's Landing, four miles north of Fort Henry. Quickly
disembarking, the Iowans moved forward to join in the attack
on the Confederate fort. Owing to the terrible condition of the road,
the footsoldiers did not arrive until after Flag Officer Foote's gunboats
had compelled the fort to surrender.
Roster and Record of Iowa Soldiers in the War of the Rebellion, To.-
gether with Historical Sketches of Volunteer Organizations 1861-1866,
II (Des Moines, 1908), 407; David W. Reed, Campaigns and Battles of
the Twelfth Regiment Iowa Veteran Volunteer Infantry (Evanston,
1903), 3-15.
9 O. R., Series I, Vol. VU, 221. 223-224.
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swept ridge. Once the lucky individuals of Cook's and Lau-
man's brigades, who had escaped the disagreeable duty on
the picket line, reached the shelter afi^ orded by the hollows
overlooking Hickman Creek, they built fires. Gathering around
the cheerful fiâmes, the troops heated their coffee, cooked
their rationiS, and dried their clothes. These basic needs taken
care of, the soldiers threw themselves on the snow-covered
ground to get a few hours' rest.^"
General C. F. Smith's third brigade. Lew Wallace's, had
left Fort Henry early on the morning of the 14th. By the time
Wallace's brigade arrived at Mrs. Crisp's log cabin, where
Grant maintained his headquarters, Cruft's and Thayer's
troops had reached the Hickman Creek staging area. General
Grant accordingly drafted an order constituting a division
composed of Cruft's and Thayer's command. Wallace was
placed in charge of the newly organized division. The rank-
ing colonel, Morgan L. Smith, assumed command of Wallace's
former brigade following the reorganization.^^
Upon being elevated to a brigade command. Colonel M. L.
Smith reported to General C. F. Smith. The general, taking
cognizance of the late hour and the limited space available,
decided to hold Smith's brigade in reserve for the time being.
M. L. Smith's troops were to bivouac for the night on either
side of the Ridge road, several hundred yards east of Mrs.
Crisp's cabin.'2
On the 14th, Lauman's brigade had been strengthened by
the addition of one regiment. The transport, McGiU, with the
2d Iowa aboard, had reached the Fort Donelson area at the
same time as the convoy carrying Cruft's and Thayer's troops.
Arriving at the Hickman Creek staging area about 11 a.m.,
the Hawkeyes were assigned to Lauman's brigade. When the
commander of the 2d Iowa, Colonel James M. Tuttle, reported
to Lauman, he was directed to form his regiment on the
brigade's extreme left. Scaling the timber covered ridge, the
10 Ibid., 229; Reed, Campaigns and Battles of the 12th Iowa, 18-19.
11 Lewis Wallace, "The Capture of Fort Donelson," Battles and Lead-
ers of the Civil War, I, 409. M. L. Smith's brigade was composed of:
the 11th Indiana, the 8th Missouri, and Battery A, 1st Illinois Light
Artillery.
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Iowans took position to the left of the 25th Indiana, vwthin
sight of the Confederate rifle pits on the opposite ridge."
Sergeant John A. Duckworth of Company C, 2d Iowa, wrote
of the regiment's arrival before the Fort Donelson perimeter,
"We landed on the south side of the Cumberland, four miles
below Dover . . . It was very cold, having snowed the night
before, and started immediately, in company with several
other regiments, to make connection with the troops that had
come up from Fort Henry, two days before."^*
Private John T. Bell of Company C recalled, "we marched
four miles over villainous roads and came to the Union forces
investing the fort, stacking arms near Ceneral C. F. Smith's
camp fire." While halted. Private Bell and many of the Iowans
"saw Ceneral Crant for the flrst time as he rode up and held a
conference with Ceneral Smith, then mounted the yellow
horse we became so familiar with afterv '^ards, and passed off
to the extreme left of the line."^^
The soldiers of the 2d Iowa long remembered the "cold
and disagreeable night" of the 14th. Private Bell reported
that at dark all the Iowans, except those detailed for outpost
duty:
. . . were withdrawn to the rear where we built fires in
a sheltered ravine and tried to make out supper with such
materials as we had with us, though we were traveling
light, with the exception of an extra weight in the way of
cartridges. We had left our blankets on the boat, and as
13 O. R., Series I, Vol. VII, 229; V. P. Twombly, The Second Iowa
Infantry at FoH Donehon, February 15, 1862 (Des Moines, 1901),
14-15; John T. Bell, Tramps & Triumphs of the Second Iowa Infantry
(Des Moines, 1961), 7-9. The 2d Iowa was organized and mustered
into Federal service at Keokuk, Iowa, on May 27, 1861. On June 13,
the regiment left the state for service in northern Missouri, where it was
assigned the vital task of guarding the railroads of that area. Toward
the end of the fourth week of July, the 2d Iowa was ordered to Bird s
Point, Missouri. The regiment remained at Bird's Point until A\igust 14,
when the Hawkeyes were sent to Pilot Knob. From Pilot Knob (on the
27th), the unit was ordered to Jackson, Missouri, where it remained until
September 8. From September 23 to October 2, the 2d Iowa was sta-
tioned at Fort Jefferson, Kentucky, and Bird's Point, Missouri. In tlie
period between October 2-12, the unit participated in the Charleston
expedition. Next, the 2d Iowa was transferred to St. Louis. The Hawk-
eyes remained at St. Louis until Febmar>' 10, 1862, when they boarded
the steamer McGill, preparatory to moving to Fort Henry. Reaching
Fort Henry on the lltli, the Iowans were ordered to proceed to tort
Donelson by water.
14 Twombly, 2d Iowa at Fort Donelson, 14-15.
IB Bell, Tramps and Triumphs, 9.
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we had no tents, suffered greatly with the cold during the
night, the ground being covered with snow. As our rations
consisted wholly of hard bread, some of us started off
foraging early the next morning, and "raised" a few
cliickens and some pork, which we boiled in a pot "bor-
rowed" of tlie people who furnished the provender.^*
* * *
Shortly after daybreak on the 15th, the full-throated roar
of battle, from the northeast caused Lew Wallace to have the
"long roU" beaten. As soon as they had mustered their units,
the regimental commanders led them to the front. Arriving
at the line of outposts, the oflicers quickly formed their men
into line of battle. This accomplished, they covered their
fronts with a sti'ong Hne of skirmishers. Initially, Wallace
beHeved McClemand was the attacker."
The heavy firing (both artillery and small-arms), however,
continued without let up. Finally, this served to raise doubts
in Wallace's mind as to the correctness of his assumption as
to the identity of the aggressor. One hour passed, then the bet-
ter part of a second, Wallace commenced to wonder—"would
it [the firing] never end." The suspense became exasperating.
About 8 a.m., a solitary horseman galloped up to Wallace's
command post. The newcomer was Major Mason Brayman,
McCIemand's assistant adjutant general.
Brayman excitedly informed Wallace that McCIemand's
division had been attacked and needed assistance. Continuing,
Brayman reported the Confederates, under the cover of dark-
ness, had massed their entire force against McClemand. At
the moment, Brayman noted, the situation was critical, not
only was the division having to give ground, but its arrmiuni-
tion had started to give out. In conclusion, Brayman stated
that McClemand had told him, "No one can tell what will be
the result if we don't get immediate help."^^
McCIemand's message thmst Wallace on the horns of a
dilemma. If Wallace chose to be guided by Grant's instruc-
tions of the previous aftemoon, "to hold . . . [his] position
and prevent the enemy from escaping," his division would
have to remain where it was. After explaining his orders to
Brayman, Wallace called for one of his staff olBcers, Lieutenr
"ifoid., 9.
" O. R., Series I, Vol. VIII, 237.
18 Source Book, 977.
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ant Addison Ware. The young lieutenant was directed to
hasten to Grant's headquarters, acquaint the general with
the situation, and request permission for Wallace's division
to march to McGlernand's assistance.^''
Pounding up to Grant's headquarters on his sweat-lathered
horse. Lieutenant Ware learned the general was absent. One
of Grant's aides informed Ware the general had departed
several hours before for the fleet anchorage, for the purpose
of conferring wdth Flag Officer Foote. FurtheiTaore, Ware
was informed, nobody at headquarters felt he had the au-
thority to authorize Wallace to go to McGlernand's assistance.
While Ware retumed to Wallace's command post, one of
Grant's staif oflicers, Gaptain William S. Hillyer, headed for
the landing. Hillyer's mission was to advise the general of
the critical tum of events.^"
* • *
About daybreak, a courier with a message from Flag Officer
Foote had galloped up to Mrs. Grisp's house. Grant was hand-
ed a dispatch informing him the Hag officer wished to see him.
In his letter, Foote pointed out that his injury (The flag offi-
cer had been wounded during the navy's attack on the Water
Batteries on the previous afternoon.) prevented his visiting
the general. After directing his adjutant general, Gaptain
John A. RawHns, to notify each of the division commanders
of his absence and "instruct them to do nothing to bring on
an engagement until they received further orders," Grant
rode off to confer with Foote. Either Gaptain Rawlins ne-
glected to carry out Grant's instructions or the staff officer
entmsted with their delivery failed to contact all the division
commanders. Wallace was certainly not apprised of Grant's
absence.
During the previous day, the road linking Union head-
quarters with the landing where the fleet was tied up had
been churned into a ribbon of mud by the passage of the
thousands of reinforcements. The intense cold on the night
of the 14th had frozen the ground solid. Gonsequently, the
general found the going difficult as he rode toward the river.
Reaching the landing, the general discovered Foote's flag-
is Ibid.; O. R., Series I, Vol. VII, 175, 237. ,
2» Source Book, 977; O. R., Series I, Vol. Vu, 237. ~' '" " ""
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ship, the ironclad Sí. Louis, anchored out in midstream. A
small boat was used to ferry the general out to the gunboat.
Boarding the Si. Louis, Grant learned from Foote that the
ironclads had been badly battered in their attack on the
Water Batteries. Foote suggested that Grant enüench his
army, while he returned to Gairo with the two most badly
damaged of the ironclads. The other two would be left be-
low Fort Donelson, charged vdth protecting the transports.
At Gairo, Foote, in addition to supei-vising the repair of the
gunboats, would seek to hasten foi-ward the ironclad Benton
and the mortar boats. Foote expressed the opinion he could
effect the necessary repairs and be back at Fort Donelson
within ten days. A cursoiy glance convinced the general
that it was mandatory to place several of the battered ii-on-
clads in drydock. Grant parted from the nag officer, believing
he would be forced to resort to a siege, if he were to reduce
the Confederate stronghold.
Just as Grant stepped ashore, he was greeted by a member
of his staff, Gaptain Hillyer. The general immediately saw
that the captain was livid with fear. Hillyer tersely informed
Grant, that a powerful Rebel force had sallied from the left
flank of the Fort Donelson perimeter and was rolling up the
Union right. Putting the spurs to his horse, the general headed
for the point of danger at a
Having failed to contact General Grant, Lieutenant Ware
returned to Wallace's command post. After the lieutenant had
informed Wallace that the members of Grant's staff had de-
clined to accept the responsibility for odering liim to rein-
force McGlemand, Brayman retraced his steps. All this time,
the roar of the battle seemed to be drawing nearer. This was
a clear indication to Wallace that the tide continued to run
against the Federals.^^
Shortly after Brayman's departure, two staff officers thtm-
dered up to Wallace's headquaiters. The older canied a sec-
ond dispatch from McGlernand. Subsequently, Wallace re-
called that this officer, "a gray-haired man in unifonn" address-
21 Ulysses S, Grant, Personal Memoirs of U. S, Grant, I (New York,
1885), 249-250; Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies
in the War of the Rebellions, Series I, Vol. 22, pp. 585-586, (Cited here-
after as O. R. N, ) , ., .
22 Source Book, 977; O. R., Series I, Vol. VII; 237.
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ed him "with tears in his eyes," as he described the situation
on the Union right. After advising Wallace that the Rebels
had turned McCIemand's right fiank, the elderly gentleman
exclaimed, "The regiments are being crowded back on the
center. We are using ammunition taken from the dead and
wounded. The whole army is in danger."^^
Wallace's initial impulse had been to send reinforcements
when he had been hailed by Major Brayman. But he had
hesitated in the face of Grant's injunction, "to hold his posi-
tion." Now, Wallace's first impulse was "seconded by judg-
ment." Wallace knew that if McClernand's division were roUed
back on his command, a general panic might ensue. "In the
absence of the commanding general," Wallace reasoned, "the
responsibility was . . . [his]." Like a good ofiScer, Wallace de-
cided to hold his previous order in abeyance. He would march
to the sound of the guns. Wallace knew tliat one regiment
would not be enough to cope with the crisis. He would send a
brigade. Turning to the grizzled-haired officer, Wallace re-
marked, "Tell General McGlemand that I will send him my
first brigade with Golonel Cruft." Pointing to the officer's com-
panion, Wallace added, "I wiU retain this gentleman to serve
as guide."^*
Having made this important decision, Wallace hastened
to Cruft's command post. The general, after tersely briefly his
subordinate on tlie critical turn of events, ordered Cnift, "to
put . . . [his] brigade in rapid motion to the exüeme right
of our Hne, for the purpose of re-enforcing General McClern-
and's division." As the two officers parted, Cmft glanced at
his watch—the time was 8:30 a.m.^ ^
Immediately following the receipt of his marching orders,
the able Cruft sprang into action. Without bothering to recall
his skirmishers, Cruft quickly assembled his brigade. Leaving
their blankets, knapsacks, and great-coats behind, Cruft's
troops, guided by McClernand's young staff officer, moved off
in colmun of companies through the woods. Gaining the Pinery
23 Ibid., It is impossible to identify the grey-haired staff ofFicer. Wal-
lace in his autobiography notes that he was a colonel. An examination
of tha roster of McClernand's staff, however, reveals that Major Brayman
was the ranking officer. In his "After Action Report" McClemand falls
to identify the officer entrusted with this second message.
24 Source Book, 977-978.
26 Ibid.; O. R., Series I, Vol. VII, 243.
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road, Cruft's bluecoats tvimed into a Uttle used country lane.
This road ascended the eastern slope of the Indian Creek
vaUey and gave ready access to the Wynn's Feny road.^"
The departure of Cruft's command left Wallace with only
one brigade—Thayer's. This brigade continued to hold the
ridge overlooking the hollow which debouches into Indian
Creek about 250 yards southwest of the Poor house. Skir-
mishers from Thayer's brigade and those left behind by Cruft
occupied the ravine in front of Wallace's main line of resist-
ance. Some time after the departure of Cruft's brigade, Wal-
lace was joined by Crant's adjutant. Captain Rawlins. Wallace
succinctly briefed Rawlins on the contents of McClernand's
two messages, and told of the dispatch of Cruft's brigade to
reinforce the Union right.^'^
When he was conversing vidth Rawlins, Wallace sighted a
number of stragglers approaching. These panic-sti-icken indi-
viduals came dashing up the "half-defined road" which cross-
ed Indian Creek valley. Wallace recalled that he and Raw-
lins, "scarcely noticed the fugitives, so much more were we
drawn by the noise behind them. That grew in volume, being
a compound of shouts and yells, mixed with the rattle of
wheels and the rataplan and throbbing rumble of hoofs in
undertone."^ ^
Rawlins in a very agitated frame of mind inquired, "What
can that be?"
Wallace replied, "It beats me. But I'll find out." Spotting an
orderly, Wallace shouted, "Ride and see what all that flurry
means." As a suspicion of the tnith suddenly struck home, Wal-
lace bade the aide not to spare his horse. Applying his spurs
to his mount, the orderly quickly disappeared from view.^ ®
Rawlins and Wallace sat astride their horses anxiously wait-
ing for the aide to return. Suddenly, a vwld-eyed, bare-headed
officer mounted on a sweat-flaked horse, came pounding up
the road. As the frightened officer thundered past, he shouted,
"We're cut to pieces."
26 Source Book, 978-980; O. R., Series I, Vol. VII, 243, 249. On mov-
ing off in column of companies, Cruft's brigade marched with the 25th
Kentucky in advance, followed by the 31st Indiana, the 17th Kentucky,
and the 44th Indiana.
2T Source Book, 978; O. R., Series I, Vol. VII, 237. 252.
28 Source Book, 978-979.
29 Ibid., 979.
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Wallace subsequently recalled that he "had never seen a
case of panic so perfectly defined, and it was curious even
impressive." The volatile Rawlins was not disposed to take a
philosophical view of the situation. Jerking his revolver from
its holster, the captain would have shot "the frantic wretch,"
had Wallace not caught his hand. Rawhns remonsü-ated with
Wallace. The officers' discussion was quickly terminated, when
the orderly came galloping up with an ominous look on his
"What is it!" Wallace bellowed.
The aide excitedly replied, "The road back there is jammed
with wagons, and men afoot and on horseback, all coming
toward us. On the plains we would call it a stampede."
Rawlins and Wallace looked at each other and there was
no need for any additional questions. McGlemand's division
was in fuU retreat.
Rawlins immediately inquired, "What are you going to do?"
Wallace replied, "There's but one thing I can do."
"What is that?" asked Rawlins.
"Get this brigade [Thayer's] out of the way," Wallace
shouted, "If those feUows strike my people, they will communi-
cate the panic." In reply, RawHns wanted to know where
Wallace proposed to send Thayer's troops.
Pointing to the west, Wallace remarked, "To take that way
is to retreat, and carry the panic to General Smitli; so I'U
go right up this road toward the enemy."
His question answered, Rawlins prepared to return to head-
quarters. When he started for the rear, Rawlins held liis
horse to a walk, so as not to alarm the men whom he passed.^ ^
Even before Rawlins had disappeared from view, Wallace
ordered the drummers to beat the "long roll." The regimental
commanders quickly formed their units. Lieutenant Peter
Wood was alerted to have his six gun battery ( Battery A, 1st
Illinois Light Artillery) accompany Thayer's brigade. By 10
a.m. the officers had assembled their men. Wallace ordered
Thayer to move by the right fiank and support McGlemand's
troops. Thayer barked out the command, "By the right flank,
file left." Thayer's brigade moved out in column of companies.
30 Ibid.; O. R., Series I, Vol. VII, 237.
31 Source Book, 979-980. . .
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The sight of Thayer's resolute troops caused Wallace's spirits
to soar. Rising to the occasion, the general barked out the com-
mand, "right shoulder shift, double-quick" time march.'''^
A short time before Wallace decided to commit Thayer,
three additional regiments had reinforced Thayer's command.
These units—the 46th, 57th, and 58th Illinois—had been trans-
ported to the Fort Donelson area on the same convoy as Thay-
er's and Gruft's brigades. Disembarking at the landing four
miles below the Water Batteries, the Illinoisians had marched
to the Hickman Greek staging area on the 14th. Here the
regimental commanders received orders attaching their miits
to Thayer's brigade. On the following morning, the three
regiments moved to the front, where they reported to Golonel
Thayer.33
Wallace paused for a few moments following Thayer's de-
parture, to try to rally the "sunshine soldiers" from McGlern-
and's division. Unable to accomplish much, Wallace, accom-
panied by his staff, prepared to ride toward the gathering
storm. Just as he was preparing to leave the ridge, Wallace
remembered Gruft's skirmishers. An aide was detached with
instructions to assemble these men and hurry them to the di-
vision's support.^*
In addition to Wallace's division, one of General G. F.
Smith's three brigades was sent from the Union, left to bolster
McGlemand's hard-pressed division. The brigade commanded
by Golonel M. L. Smith was held in reserve by General Smith
on the morning of the 15th. When Major Brayman returned
with the news that General Wallace was imable to send help,
McGlemand called for Gaptain George P. Edgar. McGlern-
and directed Edgar to hasten to General Smith's headquarters
with a request for reinforcements. Smith, Hke Wallace, in
the face of Grant's instmctions to hold his position, declined
to rush any troops to McGlernand's support. It was indeed
fortunate for the Union that Wallace finally decided to rein-
force McGlernand. Otherwise the battle would have prob-
ably been lost, while the Federal officers wasted valuable time
32 Ibid., 980; O. R., Series I, Vol. VII, 237, 252.
33 O. R., Series I, Vol. VII, 252: Report of the Adjutant General of the
State of Illinois, III, 405; IV, 66, 107.
3* Source Book, 980.
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waiting for Grant to retum from his conference with Flag
Officer Foote.35
By the time Grant returned to his GHQ, it was past 11
a.m. Following a brief conference v^ dth his staff, the general
started for the point of danger. Passing Smith's division. Grant
issued orders for the general to send M, L. Smith's brigade
to stiffen the Union right. Quickly falling in, Morgan L,
Smith's troops moved off at a rapid pace.
* * •
At dawn, Lauman's and Gook's troops, who had spent the
night camped in the hollows behind the main line of resistance
established by G. F. Smith, returned to the front. The various
imits occupied approximately the same ground on the lidge
facing the Gonfederate rifle pits, as tliey had on the previous
aftemoon. General Smith's left flank brigade-Lauman's-was
deployed from left to right: the 2d Iowa, the 25th Indiana, the
7th and 14th Iowa, and the 14th Missouri,^« Colonel Cook,
whose brigade formed tlie division's right, placed four of his
regiments in line. These units were posted from left to right:
the 12th Iowa, the 50th Illinois, the 13th Missomi, and the
52d Indiana. Cook's fifth regiment, the 7th Illinois, supported
Battery D, 1st Missouri Light Artillery.^''
Under the cover of darkness. Captain Henry Richai'dson's
cannoneers shifted two of their PaiTOtt rifles. These guns
were moved into position on the ridge, near where Captain
Edward McAllister's artillerists of Battery D, 1st Illinois Light
ArtiUery had emplaced their 24-pounder howitzers on the
13th. A slight earthwork was throvm up for the protection of
the guns. At the time the Missourians emplaced their two
Parrotts, the ridge was still occupied by Lew Wallace's troops.
Accordingly, the 7th Illinois had remained where it was, af-
36 O, R,, Series I, Vol, VII, 177,
36 Ibid., 228-229, 231-232. The 7th Iowa Infantry was organized and
mustered into Federal service at Burlington, Iowa, by Lieutenant Alex-
ander Chambers. By August 2, all the soldiers of the 7th Iowa had been
mustered in. Like most of the Iowa regiments raised at this stage of the
conflict, the 7th Iowa did not spend much time in a camp of instruction.
On August 6, just four days after the last company had been sworn in,
the régiment was embarked on the steamer Jennie Whipple. Two days
later, Üie Iowans landed at St, Louis. There, they were marched to the
govemment arsenal, where the men drew their weapons. The two flanking
companies were armed with Springfleld rifles; the other eight companies
were issued muskets which had been rifled.
After a short stay at Jefferson Barracks, the 7tb Iowa was sent to
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fording infantry protection to Richardson's other section.
These two pieces were emplaced about 400 yards southwest
of the advanced section.^^ The other battery from the 1st
Missouri light Artillery (K), which was operating with
Smith's division, continued to be held in reserve, near the
Ridge road.^ **
Once they had been relieved, the detachments which had
manned the Une of outposts dining the cold and snov^ y^ night
were allowed to go to the rear for a short break. Reaching
their regimental bivouacs, these troops were permitted to eat,
dry their clothes, and get a few minutes rest before returning
to the front.*»
Pilot Knob, Missouri, from where they were transferred to Ironton.
At Ironton, where they remained for two weeks, the Hawkeyes had
their "first opportunity to leam the manual of arms, and . . . [werej
instructed in some of the simpler movements of the company, battaüon
and regimental drill." ,
The Federal authorities used the Iowans to occupy Jackson and Cape
Girardeau. From Cape Girardeau, the 7th Iowa was shifted to the Cairo
area On November 7, the Iowans received thedr baptism under ñre at
the battle of Belmont. In this engagement, the regiment suffered ter-
ribly. One-haff of tlie Iowans engaged were hsted as casualties.
Following the battle, the regiment was sent to Benton Barracks, near
St Louis. At Benton Barracks, the unit "enjoyed a brief season of rest,
and partly made up for its losses by recruiüng.' On January 13, the
Iowans boarded the steamer Continental. The weather was so cold and
the river so full of ice that the transport was soon ice bound. As soon
as the ice became solid enough to support the soldiers, they abandoned
the stranded vessel and returned to St. Louis. Ferried across the Missis-
sippi, the regiment proceeded to Cairo by rail. At Cairo, the 7th Iowa
joined Grant s expedition against Forts Henry and Donelson. Roste» and
Record of Iowa Soldiers, I, 911-914.
Seven companies of the 14th I o w a - D to K inclusive-were ordered
into quarters at Davenport, Iowa, on dates ranging from September Aó
to October 30, 1861. These seven companies were mustered into service
during the first week of November. On November 28 and 29, the regi-
ment left Davenport by boat for St. Louis. , j n -a
Disembarking at St. Louis, the Iowans were marched to Benton üar-
racks, where in the foUowing weeks the troops were put through the
paces and hardened up preparatory to taking the field. Wliile at Benton
Barracks, the regiment attained a high state of efficiency. The soldiers,
however, suffered considerably from sickness, an experience which the
Iowans had in common wiüi most other Civil War recruits. On ^ebru-
ary 5, 1862, the regiment marched to the St. Louis wliarf and embarked
on a steamboat. After a brief stop at Cairo, the transport proceeded to
Fort Henry, where the troops disembarked. Rosier and Record of Iowa
Soldiers, II, 721-722.
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Not long after Smith's troops had taken up their battle sta-
tions, the sound of heavy firing ( artillery and small-arms ) be-
came audible. The noise of battle came from the right of the
investment line. As the morning progressed, this terrible roar
of conflict steadily drew nearer. Smith's bluecoats listened
to this noise "with bated breath and clasped muskets waiting
orders which would send them to the help of their com-
rades."*^ The historian of the 7th Illinois, D. Leib Ambrose,
vividly recalled the morning's happenings:
It snowed again last night, but this morning the sky is
clear; the clouds have disappeared, and the sunlight is
seen again on the Cumberland hills. How cheeringly does
it fall around the weary soldiers. It is indeed a blessing
sent from heaven, for Grant and liis army. But hark! we
hear the rattle of musketry. It comes from tlie right wing.
Soon we learn that . . . [Wallace's], McArthur's, and
Oglesby's brigades are engaged. The battle is now raging
furiously.*^
As the soldiers of the 2d Iowa "lounged ai-ound," several
of the boys amused themselves by cutting down, hickory sap-
lings. Private Bell recalled that when Ceorge Howell handed
an ax to one of his comrades, he remarked, "that is the first
tree I ever cut down in my life." He then added, "and it will
be the last."
"What do you mean?" inquired one of Howell's friends.
"I wiU be dead before the sun sets this evening," Howell
answered.*^
By 9 a.m. Ceneral Smith learned that Wallace had sent
Cruft's brigade to reinforce McClemand. Since this left the
section of guns which Richardson's cannoneers had mounted
in the advance work wathout any support, it troubled the gen-
eral. Simultaneously, General Smith commenced to fret lest
the Rebels launch a sortie against his extreme left. The gen-
eral believed that if such a thrust developed, it would origi-
nate in the rifle pits adjacent to the Eddyville road. Actually,
there was no danger, though the general did not know it, of
any counterattack in this sector. At this time, only one Con-
federate regiment—the 30th Tennessee—faced Smith's pow-
*i Heed, Campaigns and Battles of the 12th Iowa, 19.
42 Source Book, 1008.
*3 Bell, Trampa & Triumphs, 9.
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erful division. To guard against these fancied dangers. Smith
directed Golonel Gook to support the Missourians' Parrotts
with one regiment, while he detailed a second to cover Lau-
man's left. The 13th Missouri drew the assignment of protect-
ing the guns; the 52d Indiana the task of bolstering Lau-
man's left flank. The departiu-e of these two organizations left
Cook with only two regiments immediately available—the 50th
Illinois and the 12th Iowa.**
Meanwhile, the gunners of Battery K had committed one
of their sections. Moving forward, the Missourians emplaced
two of their Parrott rifles on the nose of tlie ridge, a short
distance to tlie right of Battery D's advance section. From this
position, the cannoneers went into action. Firing across Indian
Creek valley, the artillerists hammered away at Pfllow's at-
tacking Confederate legions. In spite of the extreme range
(one and one-fourtli miles), the Union gunners were im-
pressed with the effectiveness of their fire. Reaching tlie ridge,
the infantrymen of the loth Missouri supported both sections
of artillery.*"
Shortly after the men of the 13th Missouri had taken posi-
tion covering the four guns. Grant rode up. At this time, the
general was en route to the Union right. Observing that the
soldiers were wearing knapsacks and blanket rolls, the general,
believing the packs would impede the men's movements, di-
rected the troops to diop them on the ground.*"
The 14th Missouri, which was composed of picked marks-
men, was thrown forward to cover General Smith's main Hne
of resistance. One battalion of the regiment operated in front
of Lauman's brigade; the other was posted in Cook's sector.
Picked companies from Lauman's and Cook's brigades were
sent to reinforce the 14th Missouri on the skirmish line. Taking
position at the bottom of the ravine near the edge of the
abatis, the Union sharpshooters blazed away, whenever an un-
wary Confederate exposed himself beyond the protected con-
fines of the lifle pits. Until noon the greyclads endeavored to
answer the Yankees' fire. Besides being silhouetted against the
skyline when they sought to reply to the blueclad snipers,
** O. R., Series I, Vol. VII, 221.
*s Ibid., 224, 226; O. R., Series I, Vol. LII, pt. I, 13.
<« O. R., Series I, Vol. VII, 224.
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Golonel Head's Tennesseans were plagued by inferior arms.
Therefore, the butternuts finally tired of the one-sided contest
and all but ceased firing.'''^
* * *
By the time. Grant reached the Wyrm's Ferry road, Thayer's
brigade had stemmed the Gonfederate onslaught. There was
a lull in the battle. The cannonading had ceased: eveiybody
was asking, "What next?" When he rode up. Grant recalled,
he found many of McGlernand's troops clustered together
discussing the situation in a "most excited manner." Many of
the officers, appearing to have lost control of the situation,
had ceased to provide any leadership. The soldiers had their
arms, but no ammvmition, while there were "tons of it close at
When Grant galloped onto the scene, McGlernand and Lew
Wallace were conversing with one another. Wallace remem-
bered that Grant clutched in his hands some papers which
looked like telegrams. Giving the appearance of a man with-
out any worries. Grant "saluted and received the salutations
of his subordinates." Proceeding to the business at hand. Grant
directed McGlemand and Wallace "to retire their commands
to the heights out of cannon range, and throw up works."
Gontinuing, Grant announced that "re-enforcements were en
route, and it was advisable to await their coming." The two
division commanders told Grant "of the mishap to the First
Division, and that the road to Gharlotte was open to the
foe."*3
But by this time. Grant had begun to take cognizance of the
remarks made by some of the troops, in regard to the Rebels
having moved to the attack "with knapsacks and haversacks
filled with rations." The soldiers expressed the opinion "this
indicated a determination on . . . [the foe's] part to stay out
and fight just as long as die provisions held out." Tuming to
his chief of staff, Golonel Joseph D. Webster, Grant remai'ked,
"Some of otu- men are pretty badly demoralized; but the
enemy must be more so, for he has attempted to force his way
out, but has fallen back; the one who attacks first now will be
*T Ibid., 221, 223, 377; O. R., Series I, Vol. LII, pt. I, 10.
*8 Grant, Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, I, 252.
•*9 Wallace, "The Capture of Fort Donelson," Battles and Leaders
of the Civil War, I, 421-422.
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victorious and the enemy will have to be in a hurry if he gets
ahead of me."
Wallace recalled, "With a sudden grip . . , TGrant] crushed
the papers in his hand." In this instant all signs of disap-
pointment or hesitation vanished. In his usual quiet way Grant
addressed McGlernand and Wallace, "Gentlemen, the position
on the right must be retaken." With that he wheeled his horse
about and galloped off.^ "
While McGlernand and Wallace attacked the Gonfederate
left. General Grant proposed to hurl General Smith's division
against the Gonfederate right. Grant now saw through the
Southerners' plan. Undoubtedly, he reasoned, the butternuts
had thrown their entire force, except for a few pickets, against
McGlemand. If Smith were able to assault before the Rebel
brass could redeploy their troops, Grant reasoned, the Yan-
kees would encounter little opposition, "except from the inter-
vening abatis." As he headed toward Smith's command post.
Grant directed Golonel Webster to ride with him and call out
to the men as they passed, "Fill your cartridge-boxes quick,
and get into line; the enemy is trying to escape, and he must
not be permitted to do so." According to Grant, "This acted
like a charm the men only wanted someone to give them a
command."^ ^
* * *
It was a little before 2 p,m, when Grant reached General
Smith's command post. At the time the general accompanied
by his staff rode up. General Smith and his chief of staff,
Gaptain Thomas J. Newsham, were sitting at the base of a
large tree on the ridge facing the Gonfederate perimeter.
so Ibid., 422; Crant, Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, I, 252, Wallace
believed, probably correctly, that Crant's decision to seize the initiative
was the most important one the general was ever called upon to make.
In his article in Battles and Leaders, Wallace wrote:
In every great man's career there is a crisis exactly similar to
that which now overtook General Crant, and it cannot be bet-
ter described than as a crucial test of his nature, A mediocre
person would have accepted the news as an argument for per-
sistence in liis resolution to enter upon a siege. Had Ceneral
Crant done so, it is very probable his history would have been
then and there concluded. His admirers and detractors are
alike invited to study him at this precise juncture. It cannot
be doubted that he saw with painful distinctness the effect of
the disaster to his right vnng. Wallace, "The Capture of Fort
Donelson," Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, I, 422.
51 Grant, Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, I, 252.
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Hailing Smith, Grant remarked, "General Smith, all has failed
on our right—You must take Fort Donelson."
Smith sprang to his feet and brushing his moustache with
his right hand said, "I will do it."
While Grant was briefing him on the tactical situation.
Smith sent Captain Newsham to alert the brigade and regi-
mental commanders. After Grant had directed Smith to charge
the Confederate works to his immediate front with Cook's and
Lauman's brigade, he advised his subordinate, "he would
find nothing but a very thin line to contend with."^-
Artillery would be used to soften up the Confederates' po-
sition preparatory to Smith's attack. Smith issued insti'uctions
for Batteries D and K, 1st Missouri Light Ai-tillery to start
shelling the rifle pits scheduled to be assaulted. Batteiy D's
gunners immediately sent several projectiles screaming into
the Rebel works. When they elicited no reply, the Missouiians
promptly ceased firing. General Grant noticed this. He accord-
ingly directed Captain Richardson to send one of his sections
to support the Union right. Without a moment's hesitation,
Richardson issued marching orders to his left section whose
guns were emplaced farthest from the Southerners' entrench-
The cannoneers maiming the section of Battery K which
had been held in reserve near the Ridge road, quickly wheel-
ed their two Parrotts into position. Unlimbering tlieir pieces
on the ridge opposite the greyclads' earthworks, tlie Mis-
sourians began to blast away, employing both shot and shell.^ *
Meanwhile, General Grant had sent a staff officer to recall
the other artillery unit organic to Smith's division—Battery H,
1st Missouri Light Artillery. This battery had been sent to
52 Ibid., 252-253; Source Book, 935; O. R., Series I, Vol. LII, pt. I, 8.
The Missouri Democrat's correspondent informed his readers:
General Smith is emphatically a fighting man, and as may be
imagined, the events of tlie morning had tended to decrease
in no measure his pugnacity. When he received his long-
de.iired orders for an assault of the enemy's works, his eyes
glistened with a fire which, could it have been seen by his
maligners would have left them in no doubt as to his private
feeling in regard to the present contest. Source Book, 773.
53 O. R., Series I, Vol. LII, pt. I, 8; O. R., Series I, Vol. VII, 225.
The section sent to support the coimterthrust against the Confederate
left, returned late on the afternoon of the 15th without being engaged.
54 O. R., Series I, Vol. LII, pt. I, 13; O. R., Series I, Vol. VII, 226.
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reinforce McClernand's division, on the previous day. When
the Confederates launched their powerful onslaught, tlie bat-
tery had been forced to retire. At the time Crant's aide ar-
rived on the Wynn's Ferry, the battery was unemployed. Fol-
lowing the receipt of Crant's instructions to move to Smith's
support. Captain Frederick Welker mustered his cannoneers
and started for the Union left with three of his pieces.^"
Long before the gunners of Batteries H and K reached
his line of departure. Smith had completed his dispositions.
The general planned to assault with his left flank brigade—
Lauman's. His right brigade—Cook's—would be used to feign
an attack on the Confederates' rifle pits. If all went according
to schedule. Cook's feint would keep the gi^eyclads pinned
down, while Laiunan scored a breakthrough.^"
In accordance with Ceneral Smith's instructions. Colonel
Cook prepared to strengthen his skirmish Hne. Strong de-
tachments from the 50th Illinois and the 12th Iowa moved
down off the ridge. Working their way cautiously foi-ward,
these men reached the edge of the timber, fronting the abatis.
Here, the soldiers joined tlieir comrades who had been oc-
cupying the skirmish line since morning. Taking position the
"men went cheerfully to the work assigned them, and kept up
a warm fire on the enemy." Covered by Cook's demonstration,
Lauman's brigade surged to the attack on the left.
As soon as Colonel Cook learned that the guns which the
7th Illinois had been supporting had been ordered to the
right, he sent a messenger vvath instructions for Lieutenant
Colonel Andrew J. Babcock to move his regiment to the front.
Led by Colonel Babcock, and cheered on by Major Richard
Rowett, the IlBnoisans moved forward on tlie double."'^
When Captain Newsham alerted him to hold his brigade
ready to attack, Lauman quickly formed his command. The
2d Iowa was designated to spearhead the assault. When in-
formed of this. Colonel Tuttle gave the order "fall in!" The
regiment formed on the double behind the neat rows of
stacked rifle-muskets. After giving the command "take arms,"
Tuttle formed his Iowans into double line of battle, the left
5« Ibid.
"6 O. R.. Series I, Vol. LII, pt. I, 8; O. R., Series I. VoL VU, 221, 223.
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battaHon (Companies B, C, F, G, and K) in front and the right
in support. Golonel Tuttle would lead the advance battaHon,
while Lieutenant Colonel James Baker headed the other. ^ ^
The 2d Iowa would be covered on the left by the 52d In-
diana and on the right by another Hoosier regiment, the
25th Indiana. Preparatory to taking up the advance. Colonel
James C. Veatch of the 25th Indiana deployed and threw for-
ward, as skirmishers. Company B. The 7th and 14th Iowa ( the
former unit on the left, the latter on the right) were formed
on the right of the 25th Indiana. Before the attack jumped off,
Lauman redeployed the 14th Missouri. The picked marks-
men of this crack regiment were employed as skirmishers.
They were given the task of protecting the flanks of Lauman's
brigade during the assault. Except for the 2d Iowa and the
14th Missouri, Lauman's units would move to the attack in
colvmm by battalions."^^
Just as Colonel Tuttle finished forming his command. Gen-
eral Smith rode up. HaiHng Gaptain Newsham, who had been
assisting Tuttle, the general inquired as to the regiment. New-
sham repHed, "The 2d Iowa." General Smith tumed to the
Hawkeyes and said, "Second Iowa, you must take the fort-
take the caps off your guns—fix bayonets and I will support
you." The general took his battle station between the two bat-
talions.««
Before leading his grim Iowans down into the ravine, Tut-
tle spoke a few words. He told his men, "Now, my bully boys,
give them cold steel. Do not fire a gun until you have got
on the inside, then give them h-1! Forward, my boys! March!"
At this, the regiment moved down off the ridge. According
to Sergeant Duckworth, "determination beamed from every
eye, was written upon every face."«i
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